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ABSTRACT: A number of empirical studies seem to reject the additive
separability of preferences that is assumed in most theoretical models of the
life cycle. We show that, when additive separability is abandoned and inter-
actions between consumptions at different dates are taken into account, an
interesting relation emerges between risk aversion and length of the planning
horizon. Specifically, we show that when consumptions at different dates are
specific substitutes, risk aversion increases with horizon length. This may
explain the surprising empirical finding that individuals seem to increase the
share of wealth held in risky assets as they become older.
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1 . Introduction
For many economic issues, such as for the design of Social Security or the
management of pension funds, it is fundamental to know how individuals’
readiness to take financial risks may change as they grow older.
Such a question has been intensively addressed in the economic litera-
ture. In the standard additive model with CRRA (constant relative risk
aversion) preferences, Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) find that it is
optimal to invest in risky assets a fraction of wealth that is independent
of age. Samuelson (1989) offers a clear explanation of this result, which
contradicts conventional wisdom. Later contributions try to find ways to
escape this surprising result. Bodie et al. (1992) incorporate endogenous
labor supply into the initial Merton–Samuelson model. They find that, if
labor supply is less flexible at older ages than at younger ages, then relative
risk aversion increases with age. Another important contribution is that
of Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002), who show that—because of the dynamic
aspect of portfolio choice problems—the conclusion of Samuelson does not
extend to all additively separable preferences.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the role of nonsep-
arability of preferences. The assumption that preferences are additively sep-
arable has been consistently rejected by empirical evidence (see e.g. Muell-
bauer 1988; Carrasco, et al. 2005). Nonetheless, this assumption is still
extensively made, essentially because it is so convenient. This assumption
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is, however, crucial for discussing the impact of horizon length on attitudes
toward financial risks. In fact, we show that if additive separability is not
assumed then individuals’ relative risk aversion will generally change dur-
ing the life cycle independently of any age or wealth effects and even with
time consistent preferences. Moreover, we relate the life-cycle variations of
relative risk aversion to standard measures of complementarity and substi-
tutability of consumption occurring at different stages. Roughly speaking,
we find that if levels of consumption at different life-cycle stages are specific
substitutes then relative risk aversion indices decrease during the life cycle,
whereas such indices increase if consumptions at different stages are specific
complements.
Our results thus provide a simple explanation of why risk aversion may
change during the life cycle: individuals’ preferences may simply not be
additively separable. Moreover, our results also indicate that relaxing the
assumption of additive separability does not entail insuperable complexity.
Even when it proves difficult or impossible to solve explicitly for intertempo-
ral consumption–portfolio choices, it is still possible to deduce how relative
risk aversion varies during the life cycle by looking at intertemporal bud-
get shares, Frisch’s cross-price elasticities, and single-period indices of risk
aversion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
briefly review the empirical literature on the relation between risk aversion
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and age or horizon length. In Section 3 we study, as an illustrative example,
a simple model of portfolio choice with nonseparable preferences. Section
4 defines a natural measure of intertemporal risk aversion and shows how
this measure is related to portfolio choice. In Section 5, we consider the
case of preferences that are separable but not necessarily additive in order
to stress the impact of additivity on risk aversion. In Section 6 we examine
the general case where both separability and additivity are relaxed. The
empirical implications of our results are discussed in Section 7, and Section
8 concludes.
2 . Empirical Findings
Before delving into theoretical considerations, we may wonder whether em-
pirical studies suggest any relation between horizon length (or age) and risk
aversion. The most direct way to assess such intertemporal risk aversion
would be to elicit individuals’ preferences over lotteries on their lifetime in-
come. However, it is rather difficult to observe situations where individuals
can actually choose between several lotteries on their lifetime income. This
is why most empirical papers base their estimates on “virtual” experiments.
For example, Barsky et al. (1997) find that the relation between relative risk
aversion and age has an inverse U shape, although their sample is restricted
to people older than 50. In contrast, Guiso and Paiella (2001) find a positive
relation between risk aversion and age. However, these results should be in-
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terpreted with caution since they are based on hypothetical choices rather
than actual behavior. Also, they are cross-sectional studies and therefore
do not allow for control of cohort effects.
Another approach is to look at the share of wealth held in risky assets
and then see how it changes during the life cycle. There are many studies
that follow this track, including two recent books providing international
comparisons (Guiso et al. 2002a,b) and a longitudinal study by Ameriks and
Zeldes (2001). The cross-sectional studies reported in Guiso and colleagues
provide mixed evidence on how the share of wealth held in risky assets
varies with age. In most cases, no significant relation between age and the
share of risky assets is found, although a U-shaped relation is found in the
Netherlands and a weak positive relation is found in the United States.
Longitudinal studies are rare. The well-documented study of Ameriks and
Zeldes concludes that, after controlling for cohort effects, there is a strong
positive relation in the United States between age and the share of financial
portfolios held in risky assets.
It should be stressed that the empirical studies reported in Guiso et
al. (2002a,b) and that of Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) analyze the share of
financial wealth held in risky assets. None of them reports the share of
total wealth (including human wealth) held in risky assets, which —as is
made clear in Bodie et al. (1992)— would be the relevant information for
assessing individual relative risk aversion. The share of total wealth held in
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risky assets is related to the share of financial wealth held in risky assets as
follow:
risky assets
human wealth + financial wealth
=
(
risky assets
financial wealth
)(
1
1 + (human wealth)/(financial wealth)
)
.
Because the ratio of human wealth to financial wealth tends to decline with
advancing age, studies that focus on the ratio of risky assets to financial
wealth tend to underestimate the (positive) slope of the relation between
age and the degree of aggregate risk taking.
Thus, the absence of a relation between age and portfolio composition
that is reported in cross-sectional studies —together with the positive rela-
tion between age and portfolio risk that is found in the longitudinal study
of Ameriks and Zeldes— is consistent with a positive relation between age
and relative risk tolerance if we take human wealth into account. Such a
relation cannot be attributed to life-cycle variations in wealth, for at least
two reasons. First, most studies do control for individual wealth. Second,
it is generally found that relative risk aversion decreases with wealth and
that wealth tends to decline toward the end of the life cycle. Hence relative
risk aversion should increase with age, but the data actually support the
opposite conclusion. This paper shows that nonseparability of preferences
may explain this contradiction.
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3 . Portfolio Choice with Nonseparable Preferences:
An Illustrative Example
As mentioned in the Introduction, the aim of this paper is to discuss, in
a very general framework, the relationship between risk aversion and the
planning horizon in order to explain why the optimal degree of risk taking
may change along the life cycle. For our most general result (see Section 6)
we will assume only that agents are risk averse and have preferences that
can be represented within the expected utility framework. The cost for such
generality is that it is then impossible to derive exact analytical solutions for
standard portfolio choice problems. Our results must then rely on marginal
properties of the indirect utility function and thus are only local.
In some particular cases, however, exact solutions and global results can
be derived. We develop one such case in this section, since this will help us
examine the link between standard portfolio choice problems and our more
abstract discussion on risk aversion. The model is a discrete and simplified
version of the one in Pye (1973). Individuals live two periods and have a
lifetime von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function given by
U(C1, C2) = f(u(C1) + u(C2)),
where u(C) = lnC is the instantaneous utility function1 and f(A) = 1 −
1To neutralize age effects, we assume that the instantaneous utility is independent of
age.
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e−kA/k.
The coefficient k measures interactions between consumptions on differ-
ent dates:
∂2U
∂C1∂C2
(C1, C2) = − k
C1C2
e−k(u(C1)+u(C2)).
Thus, consumptions at dates 1 and 2 are “want independent” (additively
separable preferences)2 if k = 0, specific substitutes if k > 0, and specific
complements if k < 0. See Section 6 for the precise definitions of these
terms.
At date 0, the individual invests a fraction θ0 of her initial wealth W0 in
a risky asset, with the rest being invested in a riskless asset. At date 1 she
has wealth W1, out of which she chooses to consume C1, so her remaining
wealth is now W1−C1. She then invests a fraction θ1 of her remaining wealth
in the same risky asset. At date 2, she consumes her final wealth W2. We
denote by R˜0 and R˜1 the (random) returns of the risky asset in periods 0 and
1, returns that are presumed to be i.i.d. The riskless return is normalized
to zero, and we assume that the risky asset has a positive expected return
of R. The budget constraints are given by
W1 = W0(1 + θ0R˜0), (1)
C2 = (W1 − C1)(1 + θ1R˜1). (2)
We focus on the evolution of the share of risky assets during the life cycle
—that is, on whether or not θ0 > θ1.
2When k = 0, we adopt the usual convention that f(A) = A.
9
Observe first that, in the additively separable case (k = 0), this share is
constant: θ0 = θ1. Indeed, at date 1 the individual chooses θ1 to maximize
E[ln(1+ θ1R˜1)]. The share θ1 does not depend on W1−C1, because u(C) =
lnC is CRRA. Consumption C1 is chosen to maximize lnC1 + ln(W1−C1),
which leads to
C1 = W1 − C1 = 12W0(1 + θ0R˜0).
By backward induction, θ0 is chosen at date 0 in order to maximize
E[lnC1 + ln(W1 − C1)] = constant + 2E[ln(1 + θ0R˜0)].
As a result, if R˜0 and R˜1 are identically distributed then θ0 and θ1
coincide: the share of risky assets in the portfolio of the individual is constant
across the life cycle. Of course, this is due in part to the fact that we have
neutralized age effects and wealth effects. We claim that this is due also to
intertemporal additive separability.
In order to see this, consider now the nonadditive case (k = 0):
U(C1, C2) =
1− e−k(lnC1+lnC2)
k
=
1− C−k1 C−k2
k
.
At date 1, the individual chooses θ1 to maximize E[U(C1, (W1 − C1)(1 +
θ1R˜1))]. Again, the optimal θ1 is independent of C1 and W1 because instan-
taneous utility is CRRA (no wealth effect):
θ1 = argmax[−E (1 + θ1R˜1)−k]. (3)
As in the additively separable case, C1 is chosen to maximize lnC1 +
ln(W1 − C1), leading to C1 = W1/2, but the choice of θ0 is changed. The
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objective function becomes −E[C−k1 C−k2 ], which is proportional to
−E[(1 + θ0R˜0)−2k]. (4)
We thus obtain an expression similar to (3) but with a different exponent.
This is because the risk on the portfolio chosen at t = 0 affects two con-
sumption levels, C1 and C2, whereas θ1 affects only C2. When preferences
are not additively separable, this changes the portfolio decision.
Specifically, in our example it is easy to see that θ0 < θ1, when k > 0,
which means that the individual takes more risk at date 1. Indeed, this is
an easy consequence of the following comparative statics property (proved
in the Appendix).
Lemma 1. Let
θ∗(k) = argmax
{
1− E[(1 + θR˜)−k]
k
}
.
Then θ∗ decreases in k.
If R, the expected return on the risky asset, tends to zero while its
variance σ2 remains constant, then we can derive a simple approximation of
θ0 and θ1. A second-order Taylor expansion of (3) shows that, when R → 0,
θ0 ≈ 11 + 2k
R
σ2
and θ1 ≈ 11 + k
R
σ2
. (5)
As we shall see, this approximation could have been obtained from con-
siderations of risk aversion alone and without solving the portfolio choice
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problem: the coefficients that appear before R/σ2 in (5) are the intertem-
poral risk tolerance indices of the individual, as defined in the next section.
4 . Intertemporal Risk Aversion
The example of Section 3 shows that relaxing the assumption of additive
separability may significantly affect the relation between age and financial
strategies. But so far, it is difficult to tell what drives the result. Is it
a peculiarity of our simple model of portfolio choice, or does it reflect a
fundamental aspect of nonadditive preferences? The latter hypothesis is
actually the correct one. As we explain in what follows, interactions between
levels of consumption at different dates are a key determinant of the relation
between intertemporal risk aversion and horizon length. Moreover, since
financial strategies are closely related to intertemporal risk aversion, we also
find that portfolio choice depends on horizon length when preferences are
not additively separable. Unfortunately, optimal portfolio selection with
nonseparable preferences is a formidable computational problem, with no
hope for a closed-form solution except in special cases. So our strategy will
be (i) to define an intertemporal measure of risk aversion in a neighborhood
of a deterministic consumption profile (the risk tolerance index at age n),
and (ii) to study how this index varies during the life cycle. Then we will
show that this index allows us to obtain a good approximation of the share
of risky assets in the portfolios chosen by individuals of different ages —at
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least when the excess return of the risky asset is small.
Before introducing theoretical considerations on intertemporal risk aver-
sion, a natural question arises: How can we compare risk aversions of in-
dividuals who have different planning horizons? Individuals with differ-
ent horizons do indeed have preferences over different consumption sets.
Comparative risk aversion was originally developed by Arrow (1971) and
Pratt (1964) for preferences over a single commodity. It was extended by
Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) to the case where people consume several
goods but have the same ordinal preferences. Clearly, this cannot be ap-
plied to individuals who consume over different numbers of periods. Karni
(1979, 1983) suggested alternative approaches to multivariate comparative
risk aversion; once again, however, no clear comparison can be obtained
when applying these approaches to individuals who care for different goods.
Thus, strictly speaking there is no theoretical foundation for comparing risk
aversions of individuals with different horizon lengths.
Yet it may be possible to compare the degree of risk aversion individuals’
indirect utility functions. Again, there are various options. The comparison
can be in terms of relative or absolute risk aversion. Also, since individuals
of different ages may possess different amounts of wealth, it is not clear
whether we should control for wealth variations or not. We will define an
intertemporal index of risk tolerance and explain it as a natural measure
for analyzing how an individual’s attitude toward risk varies during the life
13
cycle.
Consider then an individual with a lifetime utility function U(C1, C2, ..., CN ),
and assume that these utilities are “time consistent”. More formally, this
means that an agent of age n with past consumption (C∗1 , C∗2 , ..., C∗n−1) has
preferences over (Cn, ..., CN ) that are represented by the utility function
Un(Cn, ..., CN ) = U(C∗1 , C
∗
2 , ..., C
∗
n−1, Cn, ..., CN ).
The price of the composite good consumed in period i is denoted pi. In
the absence of uncertainty, individuals with initial wealth W initially choose
the consumption path (C∗1 , C∗2 , . . . , C∗N ) that maximizes U(C1, . . . , CN ) un-
der the budget constraint
∑N
i=1 piCi = W . At any age n, the remaining
wealth is Wn = W −
∑n−1
i=1 piC
∗
i and individuals then choose (Cn, . . . , CN )
so as to maximize Un(Cn, . . . , CN ) under the budget constraint
∑N
i=n piCi =
Wn. The time consistency assumption implies that the solution to the max-
imization program at age n is given by (C∗n, . . . , C∗N ) and hence that indi-
viduals stick to their initial choices.
Definition 1. The intertemporal risk tolerance index at age n along con-
sumption path C∗ = (C∗1 , . . . , C∗N ) is defined as
Tn (C∗1 , . . . , C
∗
N ) = −
V ′n(Wn)
WnV ′′n (Wn)
,
where Wn = W −
∑n−1
i=1 piC
∗
i is the wealth held at age n and Vn(·) is the
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value function of an individual of age n with utility function U :
(Pn)
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
Vn(Wn) = maxCn,...,CN{U(C∗1 , . . . , C∗n−1, Cn, . . . , CN )},∑N
i=n piCi = Wn.
(6)
To illustrate why this index of risk tolerance is informative about how
attitudes toward risk change during the life cycle, we now consider two cases
in which some marginal uncertainty is added to the deterministic setting
already described.
For the first illustrative case, imagine that at age n the individual is
offered a choice between giving up a share αn of his wealth (leaving him
with wealth (1−αn)Wn) and participating in a fair lottery that provides him
with wealth (1+ ε)Wn or (1− ε)Wn with equal probability. Now ask: What
is the share αn(ε) that leaves the individual indifferent between the two
alternatives? This is similar to computing a risk premium in one-dimensional
analysis. It is easy to show that
αn(ε) =
ε2
2Tn(C∗)
+ o(ε2).
This formula means that, as a first approximation, the relative risk premium
for a lottery on the individual’s wealth at age n is inversely proportional to
the intertemporal tolerance index at age n, in conformity with the classical
analysis of Arrow and Pratt.
Our second case consists of introducing a risky asset into the economy
and then looking at the limit behavior of portfolio choices at different ages
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when the return on the risky asset tends to zero, so that the fraction of
wealth held in risky assets is small. We thus extend our model of Section
3 to the N -period case. The return of the riskless asset is still assumed
to be zero, but there is no loss of generality here since we assume that
consumption at different dates may have different prices. Individuals have
an initial wealth W0. At date 0 individuals choose θ0, the fraction of W0
that is invested in the risky asset. The return on the risky asset is R0, which
provides them, at date 1, with wealth W1 = W0(1+θ0R0). Then individuals
choose C1, and the fraction θ1 of their remaining wealth W1−p1C1, invested
in the risky asset. The return on the risky asset is R1, which provides them
at date 2 with a wealth W2 = (W1− p1C1)(1+ θ1R1). The consumption C2
is chosen, and so on until period N, when individuals end up consuming all
their wealth.
Assume that the risky returns Ri are i.i.d. with E[Ri] = R and Var(Ri) =
σ2. Denote by C∗ the consumption path that is chosen when there is no
risky asset (or when R = 0).
Lemma 2. When R is close to zero, the share of wealth invested in the
risky asset at date n is given by
θn(R) =
R
σ2
Tn+1(C∗) + o(R),
where o(R) is a function such that limR→0 o(R)/R = 0.
Proof. We use Vn(C∗1 , ..., C∗n−1,Wn) to denote the indirect utility function
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at age n. By definition
Vn(C∗1 , ..., C
∗
n−1,Wn) = {max
θn,Cn
E[Vn+1(C∗1 , ..., Cn, (Wn− pnCn)(1+ θnRn))]}.
The first-order condition of this problem with respect to θn gives
E[(Wn − pnCn)RnV ′n+1(C∗1 , ..., Cn, (Wn − Cn)(1 + θnRn))] = 0,
where the derivative is taken with respect to the last argument. If E[Rn] and thus θn
is small then, after simplifying by (Wn − pnCn), a Taylor expansion yields
E[Rn]V ′n+1(Wn − pnCn) + θnE[R2n](Wn − pnCn)V ′′n+1(Wn − pnCn) ≈ 0.
Because E[Rn] = R is small, we can replace E[R2n] by σ
2 and so obtain the
desired result.

The share of wealth invested in the risky asset at date n is therefore pro-
portional, as a first-order approximation, to the intertemporal risk tolerance
index Tn+1(C∗). We next study how Tn(C∗) changes with n; this will give
us a first approximation of how an individual’s optimal financial strategy
varies during the life cycle.
5 . Risk Aversion with Separable but Not Neces-
sarily Additive Preferences
To stress the role played by the additivity assumption that is made in most
studies, we consider in this section the simplest extension of the additively
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separable model. The (ordinal) assumption of separability of preferences
is maintained,3 but we do not assume that the von Neumann–Morgenstern
utility function is additive. From Gorman (1968) we know that ordinal sepa-
rability implies that the lifetime von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function
is of the form
U(C1, . . . , CN ) = f
(
N∑
i=1
ui(Ci)
)
.
The function f(·) and the instantaneous utility functions ui(·) are assumed
to be twice continuously differentiable and to have positive first-order deriv-
atives. The shape of f captures the interactions between consumption at
different dates: nil if f is linear, complementarities if f is convex, substi-
tutabilities if f is concave.
Proposition 1. In the additively separable case (i.e., when f is linear),
the intertemporal risk tolerance index at date n along the consumption path
C∗ = (C∗1 , . . . , C∗N ) is a weighted sum of instantaneous risk tolerance indices:
Tn(C∗) =
N∑
i=n
αni ti(C
∗
i ), (7)
where αni = piC
∗
i /(
∑N
j=n pjC
∗
j ) is the share of (remaining) intertemporal
budget spent at date i and ti(C∗i ) = −u′i(C∗i )/C∗i u′′i (C∗i ) is the instantaneous
index of relative risk tolerance at date i.
3This means that the indifference curves between consumption during two different
periods do not depend on consumption during other periods.
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This is a standard result. We do not provide a proof here because this
result is a particular case of Proposition 3, which is stated in Section 6 and
proven in the Appendix.
Equation (7) already shows different reasons why the risk tolerance in-
dex may vary during the life cycle. It may be that the functions ti(·), which
measure instantaneous risk tolerance, change with age; we would then have
“age effects”. This would be the case, for example, if (say, for some psycho-
logical reasons) older individuals prove to be more or less risk averse than
younger ones with respect to instantaneous consumption. Another possibil-
ity is that the functions ti(·) are all identical (no age effects) but that they
are not constant in C∗ and that consumption changes during the life cycle;
then we would have “wealth effects”. However, since the weights αni in (7)
sum to unity, it is clear that —except for these age and wealth effects—
there is no other element that could cause risk aversion to change during
the life cycle: if ti(C∗i ) is independent of i, then Tn(C
∗) is independent of n
and there are no horizon effects.
If instantaneous utility functions are all identical (no age effect) and
CRRA (so that there is no wealth effect), then relative risk tolerance is
constant over the life cycle. This explains why there is no relation between
horizon length and relative risk aversion in the model of Merton (1969) and
Samuelson (1969).
19
From now on, we consider the effect on risk tolerance of relaxing additive
separability. To do this, we neutralize age effects by assuming that, up to
a time preference factor, the instantaneous utility functions are identical
across dates, (ui ≡ δiu with δi > 0). We also neutralize wealth effects by
considering stationary consumption paths. Proposition 2 shows that, when
f is nonlinear, risk tolerance indices vary during the life cycle.
Proposition 2. Along any stationary consumption path (C∗, C∗, . . . , C∗),
the sequence of intertemporal risk tolerance indices T1, . . . , TN is increasing
if f ′′ < 0, decreasing if f ′′ > 0, and constant if f ′′ ≡ 0.
Proof. In order to sustain a stationary consumption path, prices must be
proportional to δi; we normalize them so that
∑
i≥n pi = 1. Then W = C
∗,
and Vn is explicit:
Vn(W ) = f
⎡⎣∑
i<n
δiu(C∗) +
⎛⎝∑
i≥n
δi
⎞⎠u(W )
⎤⎦ . (8)
Thus, we can immediately find V ′n as follows:
V ′n(W ) = f
′(A)
⎛⎝∑
i≥n
δi
⎞⎠u′(W ),
where A denotes the term within brackets in (8), as computed at the sta-
tionary consumption path (W,W, . . . ,W ) (notice that A is independent of
n). Similarly, we have
V ′′n (W ) = f
′(A)
⎛⎝∑
i≥n
δi
⎞⎠u′′(W ) + f ′′(A)
⎛⎝∑
i≥n
δi
⎞⎠2 u′2(W ).
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Therefore,
Rn =
1
Tn
= −C
∗u′′(C∗)
u′(C∗)
− C∗ f
′′(A)
f ′(A)
⎛⎝∑
i≥n
δi
⎞⎠u′(C∗). (9)
When f is linear (f ′′ = 0), risk aversion is constant along any stationary con-
sumption path (C∗, C∗, . . . , C∗) and is equal to the static risk aversion index
−C∗(u′′/u′)(C∗). However, if f ′′ = 0 then there is a correcting term, which
is positive and decreasing in n when f ′′ < 0 but negative and increasing in
n when f ′′ > 0. 
It remains to extend this analysis to the case where preferences are nei-
ther additive nor separable. This is our task in the next section.
6 . The Impact of Consumption Interactions on
Risk Aversion
The previous section made it clear that relaxing the assumption of additive
separability may lead one to revise significantly the relation between horizon
length and risk aversion. It would, however, be excessively optimistic to
say that empirical studies have so far clearly established how consumption
at different moments in time interacts with consumer preferences. Most
papers that challenge the additivity assumption have proposed particular
extensions of the additively separable model and then tested whether such
extensions fit the data better. For example, this is the case with papers on
“habit formation”, which extend the standard additive model by allowing
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the marginal utility of current consumption to depend on past consumption
(see e.g. Muellbauer 1988; Dynan 2000). However, the choice of these
extensions is guided by intuitive arguments or by technical reasons, not by
empirical evidence. The additive model is probably unrealistic, but equally
doubtful is the validity of these simple extensions and of the separable but
nonadditive model examined in Section 5.
Given these doubts, we consider it important to derive results that do
not rely on any particular specification. In the following we therefore study
the general case in which preferences are represented by a concave, and twice
continuously differentiable von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function,
U(C) = U(C1, C2, ..., CN ),
without making any further assumptions. With this general formulation, we
must resort to the fundamental concepts of utility theory in order to describe
individual preferences. Since we are interested in the cardinal properties of
the utility function, we will naturally refer to the seminal contributions of
Frisch (1959) and Houthakker (1960) and will use their terminology.
Definition 2. Consumptions at dates i and j are specific substitutes if
and only if [D2U ]−1ij > 0. They are specific complements if and only if
[D2U ]−1ij < 0, and they are want independent if and only if [D
2U ]−1ij = 0.
With additively separable preferences, all consumptions at different pe-
riods are “want independent” because [D2U ] (and thus [D2U ]−1) is diagonal
(or block diagonal if several goods are consumed during each period).
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Definition 3. The coefficient of specific substitutability between consump-
tions at dates i and j (for a consumption profile C) is given by
κij(C) =
uiuj [D2U ]−1ij
Ciui + Cjuj
, (10)
where ui = ∂U/∂Ci for i = (1, . . . , N).
This coefficient is positive if consumptions at dates i and j are specific
substitutes and is negative if they are specific complements. It is related to
the notion (see Frisch 1959) of “want elasticity” of consumption at date i
with respect to consumption at date j:
xij ≡ uj
Ci
[D2U ]−1ij for i = j.
However, we prefer to use the κij rather than the xij , because the for-
mer more clearly show the symmetry of our results (the κij are symmetric
whereas the xij are not).
The following result gives a general formula linking risk tolerance indices
during the life cycle to coefficients of specific substitutability between con-
sumption at different dates (the κij , as defined in (10)). Our formula is valid
when interactions are small —that is, when κ ≡ maxi=j |κij | is small.
Proposition 3. When interactions between consumption at different dates
are small, the intertemporal risk tolerance index at age n (along consumption
path C∗) can be approximated by a weighted sum of instantaneous risk tol-
erance indices plus a correcting term. This correcting term is negative when
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consumptions at different dates are specific substitutes. More specifically,
the relative risk tolerance at age n is given by
Tn(C∗) =
∑
i≥n
αni ti(C
∗)−
∑
i,j≥n
i=j
(αni + α
n
j )κij + κo(κ), (11)
where
ti(C∗) = −
∂U
∂Ci
(C∗)
C∗i
∂2U
∂C2i
(C∗)
is the instantaneous risk tolerance index at date i,
αni =
C∗i
∂U
∂Ci
(C∗)∑
j≥n C
∗
j
∂U
∂Cj
(C∗)
is the budget share spent at date i (relative to the budget to be spent in the
remaining periods of life), κ = maxi=j |κij |, and o(κ)/κ → 0 when κ → 0.
Proposition 3 (see Appendix for proof) allows one to measure the bias
introduced by neglecting intertemporal interactions. If U is additively sepa-
rable (i.e., if U(C) =
∑
i ui(Ci)), then all the κij are zero and the intertem-
poral risk tolerance index Tn(C∗) reduces to a weighted sum of instantaneous
indices, as stated in Proposition 1. However, if consumptions at different
dates are specific substitutes (κij > 0) but such interactions remain small
(κ small), then the relative risk tolerance at age n is decreased by a factor
that roughly equals a weighted sum of coefficients of specific substitutability
between consumption at different dates. The adjustment for risk tolerance is
therefore negative when consumptions at different dates are specific substi-
tutes and positive when such consumptions are specific complements. More
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generally: if some goods are specific complements to themselves (at other
dates) but others are specific substitutes, then the sign of the bias is given
by the sum of these coefficients weighted by the budget shares.
Equation (11) suggests that, barring additive separability, there may be
a gap between relative risk tolerance with respect to instantaneous consump-
tion and relative risk tolerance with respect to wealth. If consumptions at
different periods of time are specific complements, then agents may be highly
risk averse with respect to instantaneous consumption and moderately risk
averse with respect to wealth. This is what happens with the specification
chosen by Constantinides (1990) to solve the equity premium puzzle. On
the other hand, if consumptions at different dates are specific substitutes,
then relative risk aversion with respect to wealth may be much larger than
relative risk aversion with respect to instantaneous consumption. This is the
case in the model proposed by Ahn (1989) for solving the equity premium
puzzle. It is troubling, however, to see that both specific complementarity
and specific substitutability were used to solve the same empirical puzzle.
The key to understanding the relationship between risk aversion and
planning horizons, is to notice that the size of the correcting term that
accounts for the nonseparability of preferences varies with horizon length.
Indeed, this term, which is given by
−
∑
i,j≥n
i=j
(αni + α
n
j )κij , (12)
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is a sum restricted to indices i and j that are equal to or greater than the
current age n. There are (N −n)(N −n+1)/2 terms in that sum. However,
the relative budget shares αni are (on average) lower when the horizon length
is large, since
∑
i≥n α
n
i = 1 by definition. Roughly speaking (i.e., omitting
the variations in the κij and in the αni ), there are (N − n)(N − n + 1)/2
terms of size 2κ/(N −n+1) in the sum shown in (12), which gives a term of
size κ(N −n). Hence, the correcting term increases (in absolute value) with
the strength of the interaction between consumption at different dates and
with horizon length. The bias due to the assumption of additive separability
is therefore typically larger for younger individuals —who still have many
periods to live— than for older individuals.
The reason why complementarity or substitutability of consumption at
different dates affects intertemporal risk tolerance is rather intuitive. For
individuals who smooth their consumption during the life cycle, a negative
shock to wealth at date n will yield negative shocks to consumption in all
remaining periods of life; likewise, a positive shock to wealth will generate
positive shocks to consumption. The point we stress is that, regardless of
whether the shock to wealth is positive or negative, it generates a sequence
of shocks on instantaneous consumption that are positively correlated. Risk
aversion with respect to wealth is therefore akin to risk aversion with respect
to positively correlated risks on instantaneous consumption. If consump-
tions at different periods are neither complements nor substitutes (as in the
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additive model), then it does not matter that the risks on instantaneous
consumption are positively correlated. However, as soon as there are substi-
tutabilities or complementarities between consumption at different periods,
the positive correlation does matter: it increases the degree of risk aversion
when consumptions at different periods are substitutes and decreases that
risk when they are complements. This explains the sign of the correcting
term in (11). The magnitude of the correction depends on the number of
correlations at play, and it is therefore increasing (in absolute value) with
the number of remaining periods of life. This explains the horizon effect
that we obtain.
7 . Are Consumptions at Different Ages Specific
Substitutes or Specific Complements ?
Equation (11) shows that the relation between relative risk aversion and hori-
zon length depends on the sign of the coefficients of specific substitutability.
It would thus appear important to see if there are any empirical findings or
theoretical arguments that suggest a particular sign for the κij .
To our knowledge, the only4 paper to provide estimates of cross “want
elasticities” is Browning (1991). For reasons of parsimony, Browning con-
siders such elasticities to be nonzero only for expenditures in adjacent time
periods (expenditures at date t interact only with expenditures at dates
4There is, however, an empirical literature on the estimation of Frisch intertemporal
demand functions initiated by the influential study of labor supply by MaCurdy (1981).
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t − 1, t, and t + 1). He finds that such interactions are small but non-
negligible. Most types of expenditures seem to be want independent, but
expenditures on durables are found (as expected) to be specific substitutes
with themselves in adjacent periods.5
Hayashi (1985) also provides some support for the presumption that con-
sumptions at different moments in time are substitutes. Although Hayashi
does not estimate “want elasticities”, his findings indicate that changes in
consumption are strongly negatively autocorrelated. Hayashi attributes such
a result to the “durability of consumption”. This is actually another way of
expressing that consumptions at different moments in time are substitutes.
Theoretical arguments can also be given for why consumptions at differ-
ent dates can be specific substitutes. This involves the notion of “temporal
risk aversion” or “intertemporal correlation aversion” introduced by Richard
(1975). To illustrate this notion, consider for example two dates (n = 1, 2)
and two intertemporal lotteries:
L1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
(C1, C2)
(c1, c2)
and L2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
(C1, c2)
(c1, C2)
,
where each outcome (in both lotteries) occurs with equal probability. As-
sume that c1 < C1 and c2 < C2. An individual with additively separa-
ble preferences (i.e., U(C1, C2) = U1(C1) + U2(C2)) is indifferent between
5Browning also finds that fuel is a specific complement with itself, but the coefficient
is smaller.
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L1 and L2, since both lotteries give the same sum of expected utilities
(1/2)(U1(c1) + U1(C1)) + (1/2)(U2(c2) + U2(C2)). But this is generally not
the case when preferences are not additively separable. Now we say that an
individual is “averse to intertemporal correlation” if he prefers L2 to L1. In-
tuitively, she prefers having some of the worst and some of the best to taking
a chance on all of the worst or all of the best. Such a pattern happens when
∂2U/∂C1∂C2 < 0 and hence when goods 1 and 2 are specific substitutes.
In the N -period model, it is no longer true that aversion to intertemporal
correlation and positive specific substitutability are equivalent properties.
However, the equivalency holds locally when we consider weak interactions.
Indeed, from Lemma 3 (see Appendix) we know that, when interactions are
weak, we have
[D2U ]−1ij ≈ −
∂2U
∂Ci∂Cj
∂2U
(∂Ci)2
∂2U
(∂Cj)2
. (13)
Thus, when interactions are weak, preferences that exhibit aversion to in-
tertemporal correlation also exhibit positive specific substitutability.
Another point can be made by comparing relative risk aversion and in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is well known that the standard
specification of the life-cycle model with additive preferences and isoelastic
instantaneous utility functions implies that relative risk aversion equals the
inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The most popular way
to break this unpleasant relation between two apparently distinct concepts
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is to relax the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms and follow the theory
developed by Kreps and Porteus (1978) on temporal lotteries (see e.g. Ep-
stein and Zin 1989; Farmer 1990; Weil 1990; Campbell 1993). However
the relation can also be broken while remaining within the standard von
Neumann–Morgenstern framework on atemporal lotteries. Actually, within
this framework the (local) relative risk aversion always equals the inverse of
the (local) intertemporal elasticity of substitution if and only if the utility
function is additively separable (see Bommier 2003). Moreover, the differ-
ence between (local) relative risk aversion and (local) intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution is precisely determined by aversion to intertemporal
correlation. Because aversion to intertemporal correlation and specific sub-
stitutability are closely related (at least when interactions are weak), the
coefficients of specific substitutability considered in this paper can be re-
lated to the difference between local measures of intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and local indices of relative risk aversion. By definition, the
elasticity of substitution between consumptions at dates i and j (holding
consumption in other periods constant) is given by6
σij =
(
Ci
∂U
∂ci
)−1
+
(
Cj
∂U
∂cj
)−1
−∂2U/(∂Ci)2
(∂U/∂Ci)2
+ 2 ∂
2U/∂Ci∂Cj
(∂U/∂Ci)(∂U/∂Cj)
− ∂2U/(∂Cj)2
(∂U/∂Cj)2
.
It follows easily from (10) and (13) that, to a first-order approximation, the
6Note that, with additively separable preferences and an isoelastic instantaneous utility
function, the σij equal a constant —the “intertemporal elasticity of substitution”.
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coefficients of specific substitutability are also given by
κij ≈ 12rirj
[
αj
αi + αj
(
ri − 1
σij
)
+
αi
αi + αj
(
rj − 1
σij
)]
,
where
ri = −
Ci
∂2U
(∂Ci)2
∂U
∂Ci
is the relative risk aversion index with respect to consumption in period i
and αi is the budget share spent in period i. Thus, if all local coefficients of
relative risk aversion are greater than the inverse of intertemporal elasticity
of substitution between any two periods, then preferences exhibit positive
specific substitutability. Empirical measures of local relative risk aversion
indices and intertemporal elasticities of substitution could then be used to
determine whether consumptions at different dates are specific complements
or rather specific substitutes —and ultimately to elucidate the relation be-
tween horizon length and intertemporal risk aversion.7 Unfortunately, both
7Equation (11) can be rewritten as
Tn(C
∗) =
 
i≥n
αni ti(C
∗)−
 
i,j≥n
i=j
αnj (ri − 1/σij)
rirj
+ κo(κ).
It is therefore clear that the correcting term that appears in (11) and accounts for
interactions between consumption at different dates can also be written, to a first-order
approximation, as a weighted sum of differences between local relative risk aversion indices
and the inverse of local intertemporal elasticities of substitution. In particular, when all
local relative risk aversion indices are greater than inverse elasticities of substitution, the
correction is negative. Moreover, for the same reasons as given after (12), the magnitude
of the correction typically increases with horizon length.
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risk aversion and intertemporal elasticities of substitution are particularly
difficult to measure, and the empirical literature remains inconclusive about
the sign and the magnitude of these differences.
To conclude this section on intertemporal interactions, we discuss the re-
lation between specific interactions and habit formation. For technical rea-
sons, most papers on habit formation assume that the intertemporal utility
function has some form of additive structure. Namely, the N -period utility
function is generally specified as the sum of instantaneous utility functions:
UH(C1, ..., CN ) =
N∑
i=1
Vi(Ci, Xi), (14)
where Xi (the stock of habits in period i) is positively related to consump-
tions in the previous periods. The cross-derivatives ∂2Vi/∂Ci∂Xi are as-
sumed to be positive. Of course, since Xi depends on consumption in previ-
ous periods, such preferences are not additively separable. Still, the struc-
ture of (14) imposes strong restrictions. In particular, since ∂Xi/∂Cj > 0 for
any j < i and since ∂2Vi/∂Ci∂Xi > 0 for any i, we have ∂2UH/∂Ci∂Cj > 0
for any i = j. Hence, preferences as represented by (14) exhibit negative
intertemporal correlation aversion, and the coefficients of specific substi-
tutability are therefore negative. Thus, it appears that most papers on
habit formation do assume that consumptions at different dates are specific
complements, which implies that there is a positive relationship between
risk tolerance and horizon length. However, this follows only because these
papers rely on the specific structure of (14). For a general (not additively
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separable) specification, there is no systematic relation between habit for-
mation and specific substitutability. Habit formation (as defined in Becker
and Murphy 1988) is equivalent to the notion of adjacent complementar-
ity introduced by Ryder and Heal (1973). Preferences are said to exhibit
adjacent complementarity if
∂
∂Ci
( ∂U
∂Ci+1
∂U
∂Ci+2
)
> 0 forall i ≤ N − 2
(i.e., if marginal rate of substitution between present and future consump-
tion increases with past consumption). This is an ordinal notion that is
preserved under any increasing transformation. In other words, if a utility
function U exhibits adjacent complementarity then any monotonic transfor-
mation U˜ = f(U) will also exhibit adjacent complementarity. However, for
f sufficiently concave, consumptions at different dates become specific sub-
stitutes. Preferences involving habit formation can therefore exhibit specific
complementarity as well as specific substitutability.
8 . Concluding Remarks
We have shown in this paper that interactions between consumptions at
different dates could generate variations of relative risk aversion during the
life cycle, even if tastes do not vary with age and even if we control for
wealth effects. More specifically, Proposition 2 has shown that, if the von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility of an individual is a concave transformation
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of an additively separable function, then relative risk aversion decreases with
age along any stationary consumption path. Proposition 3 extends this re-
sult to a more general form of interactions and to nonstationary consumption
paths, and this enables us to evaluate the bias introduced by the additive
separability assumption in the estimation of intertemporal risk aversion.
This bias is approximately equal to minus the sum of specific substitutabil-
ity coefficients as weighted by budget shares. The bias is typically larger
(in absolute values) for young individuals —who still have many periods to
live— than for older ones.
Our results can be used in different ways. We can apply them to models
that assume simple specifications for the utility function. Take, for example,
an exponential transformation of a sum of CRRA utilities:
U(C) = −1
k
exp
{
−k
N∑
i=1
C1−γi − 1
1− γ
}
, (15)
where k is positive. A simple application of equation (9) immediately yields
the relative risk aversion coefficient Rn of an individual of age n along any
constant consumption path:
Rn =
1
Tn
= γ + k(N − n + 1)C1−γ . (16)
As expected, Rn decreases with n because k > 0.
The utility function that we used for our illustrative example in Section
3 is obtained for γ = 1 and N = 2. From (16) we obtain T1 = 1/(1 + 2k)
and T2 = 1/(1 + k), which (when combined with Lemma 2), leads to the
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result obtained in Section 3; see (5). We have thus found two ways to obtain
the same results. The first way, which we followed in Section 3, consists of
providing an explicit solution to the portfolio choice problem and deriving
some of its properties; this is indisputably the most popular approach in the
finance literature. The second way consists of looking at marginal properties
of the utility function and in particular at our measure of intertemporal risk
tolerance indices. The first method has an obvious advantage: it works even
when the share of risky assets is relatively large and portfolio risks are not
small. But it has also a major drawback: it can only work when it is possible
to derive a closed-form solution to the portfolio choice problem. Needless
to say, the number of specifications for which such closed-form solutions are
available is extremely limited. The literature has naturally focused on these
particular specifications, but there is no reason to suppose they should fit
observed behavior particularly well.
The alternate route that we have followed in this paper does not suffer
from such technical constraints. In fact, our results make it possible to
derive estimates of how risk aversion varies with age—even if we only have
only a limited and local knowledge of individual preferences. Consider, for
example, equation (11):
Tn(C∗) =
∑
i≥n
αni ti(C
∗)−
∑
i,j≥n
i=j
(αni + α
n
j )κij + κo(κ).
Budget shares αni usually are relatively well observed. The other ingredients
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needed to obtain intertemporal risk tolerance indices as a function of age
are local estimates of the instantaneous risk tolerance indices, ti(C∗), and
the coefficients of specific substitutability, κij . Imagine for instance that
all the budget shares are observed to be equal. Also assume that, at the
optimal consumption path, there is no variation in the instantaneous indices
of relative risk tolerance during the life cycle (ti(C∗) = 1/γ) and that the
coefficients of specific substitutability are of the form κij = κρ|i−j|−1. Then
the parameter κ gives the strength of the interactions while ρ determines
their shape (specific substitution decreases with time distance if ρ < 1 and
increases with time distance if ρ > 1). In such a case, (11) leads to
Tn(C∗) ≈ 1
γ
− 2κ
N − n + 1
∑
i,j≥n
i=j
ρ|i−j|−1
=
1
γ
− 4κ
N − n + 1
[
ρ(ρN−n − 1) + (N − n)(1− ρ)
(1− ρ)2
]
. (17)
This relation between relative risk tolerance and horizon length is shown in
Figure 1; the corresponding picture for the relative risk aversion is displayed
in Figure 2. In particular, we observe that the relation between relative risk
tolerance and horizon length is convex (concave) if specific substitutability
between consumption levels at different dates decreases (increases) with time
distance between these dates.
An unresolved issue is whether considering risk aversion suffices to pro-
vide a relatively good approximation of the life-cycle financial strategy of
individuals. We have shown that this is the case when the share of risky
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assets are small, but one may wonder whether it remains true when agents
take noninfinitesimal risks. In this case, an individual’s wealth follows a
random path, and the dynamic aspects of the problem (as emphasized in
Gollier and Zeckhauser 2002) must be considered. In particular, it matters
whether risk tolerance indices are convex or concave with respect to wealth.
Whether these considerations are likely to generate larger effects than those
discussed in this paper is difficult to tell. However, one can reasonably pre-
sume that the fundamental properties of preferences that drive the result
of Gollier and Zeckhauser (and are related to the fourth derivative of the
utility function) will be more difficult to test empirically than the comple-
mentarities and substitutabilities that we have discussed here, which depend
on second derivatives only. In particular, the impact of nonseparability an-
alyzed in this paper is already present when instantaneous preferences are
CRRA, whereas the phenomenon studied by Gollier and Zeckhauser would
vanish in this case.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We have
θ∗(k) = argmax{ϕ(θ, k)},
where
ϕ(θ, k) =
1− E[1 + θR˜]−k
k
.
To establish that θ∗(·) is decreasing, it is enough to show that (∂2ϕ/∂θ∂k)(θ∗(k), k) <
0 (single crossing property).
Indeed,
∂ϕ
∂θ
= E[R˜(1 + θR˜)−i−1]
and
∂2ϕ
∂k∂θ
= −E[R˜ ln(1 + θR˜)(1 + θR˜)−k−1].
Now, for all θ > 0 and all R˜ we have R˜ ln(1 + θR˜) > 0. Thus ∂2ϕ/∂k∂θ <
0. That θ∗(k) > 0 follows from our assumption that E[R˜] > 0 (since
(∂ϕ/∂θ)(0, k) = E[R˜]). 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof relies on two simple ingredients.
1. A formula due to Hanoch (1977) that relates T (C), the intertempo-
ral risk tolerance index along a consumption path C, to the matrix
[D2U ]−1(C) and the utility gradient ∇U(C):
T (C) =
t∇U [D2U ]−1∇U
tC∇U
.
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2. The following linear algebra lemma about the inverse of nonsingular
matrices that are almost diagonal.
Lemma 3. Consider a matrix M = [mij ] with mii = 0 for all i, and note
that m = supi=j |mij |. Then, when m is small enough, M is nonsingular
and the (i, j)th elements of M−1 are given by
[M−1]ii =
1
mii
+ mo(m) and
[M−1]ij = − mji
miimjj
+ mo(m) if i = j
where o(m)/m → 0 when m → 0.
Proof. Take M nonsingular, with m = supi=j |mij | close to zero, and
define ϕij [M ] = [M−1]ij , the generic term of M−1. The value of ϕij [M ] is
given explicitly by the classical formula
ϕij [M ] =
(−1)i+j det[Mji]
det[M ]
, (A1)
where det[A] denotes the determinant of any square matrix A and Mij is
the submatrix obtained by deleting the ith row and the jth column of M .
Define Δ = diag[M], the matrix obtained from M by deleting off-diagonal
terms. Because ϕij is differentiable on its domain (we note its derivative by
Dϕij), we can write a Taylor expansion around Δ that is valid for m small:
ϕij [M ] = ϕij [Δ] + Dϕij [Δ](M −Δ) + mo(m),
where o(m)/m → 0 when m → 0.
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Since ϕii(Δ) = (mii)−1 and ϕij(Δ) = 0 for i = j, Lemma 3 is proven
if we can establish that Dϕii(Δ)(M − Δ) = 0 and Dϕij(Δ)(M − Δ) =
(−1)i+jmji/miimjj for i = j. To do so, let us first compute the partial
derivatives of ϕij by differentiating (A1) with respect to mkl (for arbitrary
k, l). This yields
∂ϕij
∂mkl
(Δ) =
(−1)i+j
det(Δ)
∂(det(Mji))
∂mkl
∣∣∣∣
M=Δ
− (−1)i+j det(Δji)
det 2(Δ)
∂(det(M))
∂mkl
∣∣∣∣
M=Δ
.
Now
∂(det(Mji))
∂mkl
∣∣∣∣
M=Δ
= (−1)i+j−1 det(Δ)
miimjj
if k = i and l = j,
= 0 otherwise;
and
∂[det[M ]]
∂mkl
=
det([Δ]
mkk
if k = l,
= 0 otherwise.
Since (M −Δ)kl = mkl if k = l and zero otherwise, if follows that
Dϕij(Δ)(M −Δ) = −nij
miimjj
if i = j,
= 0 if i = j.
Thus we have established the desired result:
Dϕij(Δ)(M −Δ) = 0 if i = j,
= − mji
miimjj
if i = j.
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Proof of Proposition 3. We are now in a position to prove Proposition 3.
For any past consumption (C∗1 , ..., C∗n−1), we define
Un(Cn, ..., CN ) = U(C∗1 , ..., C
∗
n−1, Cn, ..., CN ),
Using Hanoch’s formula (see Hanoch 1977, p. 416) in developed form yields
Tn(C) = −
N∑
i=n
[D2Un]−1ii u
2
i
tc∇Un −
∑
i=j
n≤i,j≤N
[D2Un]−1ij uiuj
tc∇Un , (A2)
where ui = ∂Un/∂Ci = ∂U/∂Ci. Recall the expressions of the relative
budget shares αni = Ciui/
tc∇Un, specific substitutability coefficients κij =
[D2U ]−1ij uiuj/ciui + cjuj , and instantaneous risk tolerance coefficients ti =
−ui/Ci(∂2U/∂C2j ). Lemma 3 shows that, when κ = maxi=j |κij | is small,
[D2Un]−1ii =
(
∂2Un
∂C2i
)−1
+ κo(κ) =
(
∂2U
∂C2i
)−1
+ κo(κ)
and thus
− [D
2Un]−1ii u
2
i
tc∇Un = α
n
i ti + κo(κ).
Moreover, for i = j we have [D2Un]−1ij = [D2U ]−1ij + κo(κ) by Lemma 3,
so
[D2Un]−1ij uiuj
tc∇Un = (α
n
i + α
n
j )κij + κo(κ).
Therefore, (A2) can be written as
Tn(C) =
N∑
i=n
αni ti −
∑
i=j
n≤i,j≤N
(αni + α
n
j )κij + κo(κ),
and the proof of Proposition 3 is complete. 
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